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Effects of Threat Conditioning on 
the Negative Valanced Systems and 
Cognitive Systems
Rodrigo S. Fernández, Soledad Picco, Fernando Messore & María E. Pedreira
Threat conditioning is held as a model of anxiety disorders. However, this approach is focused on 
implicit responses evaluated in a single day. Here, we evaluated negative-valence, positive-valence 
and cognitive-systems in order to evaluate the extent to which threat conditioning models anxiety 
disorders. Subjects underwent threat conditioning and five-minutes (Short-term evaluation) or 48 hs 
(Long-term evaluation) later, both groups performed several tasks targeting cognitive-systems and 
valenced-systems. In the short-term evaluation, successful conditioning maintained state-anxiety and 
increased the aversiveness representation of the CS+ and the valuation for negative events. Reaction-
times for the CS+ were faster, reflecting an attentional bias toward threat. In the long-term evaluation, 
participants represented the CS+ as more aversive and generalized to all stimuli. Reaction-times 
showed a more restricted attentional bias. Threat conditioning alters the negative-valence systems and 
creates a cognitive bias, which is transformed by memory consolidation, suggesting that this protocol 
could be a useful resource to understand the deficits associated with anxiety disorders.
Anxiety and fear-related disorders as a group are the most prevalent mental illness1,2. Individuals with anxiety dis-
orders are excessively anxious, fearful and avoidant of a large range of internal or external threats. At the behav-
ioral level, fear and anxiety frequently overlap; however, they can be differentiated by considering the level of 
uncertainty regarding the probability, timing or nature of future danger3–5. Fear refers to a defensive motivational 
response to an actual (acute) or immediate threat6. In contrast, anxiety is defined as a persistent and generalized 
defensive response to a potential, unpredictable or uncertain threat3,7,8. Typical anxiety symptoms are physiolog-
ical (i.e., muscle tension, palpitations, dizziness, nausea), cognitive (i.e., fear of losing control, hypervigilance, 
worry), behavioral (i.e., avoidance, freezing) and emotional (i.e., arousal, fearfulness, impatience).
From Pavlov’s “experimental neurosis”9 to the modern neuroscientific theories10,11, it is clear that learning, 
and more specifically, Pavlovian threat (fear) conditioning, plays a critical role in the pathogenesis and mainte-
nance of anxiety disorders11,12. Ultimately, anxiety disorders are not acquired in an instant and actually develop 
gradually. However, threat conditioning in animals and healthy populations is held as a model of anxiety- and 
fear-related disorders. As a laboratory model, threat conditioning, conceptualized as an aversive-implicit mem-
ory, has allowed researchers to gain tremendous knowledge about the neurobiological basis of anxiety disorders 
and to develop novel treatments13,14. However, considering that anxiety disorders engage physiological, emotional 
and cognitive changes, this approach reduces the modeled disorder to an acquired associative response at phys-
iological (i.e., heartbeat interval, electrodermal activity, etc.) and declarative (i.e., contingency awareness) levels. 
As a result, this research bias neglects fundamental aspects of threat processing and anxiety disorders such as 
valenced (positive/negative), cognitive or regulatory domains.
On the other hand, the current diagnosis system is suffering a shift from a categorical classification (DSM V) 
to a dimensional one including a constellation of factors. Consequently, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoc)15 
proposed a framework to study mental illness using a dimensional matrix that considers different domains (pos-
itive, negative, cognitive, regulatory or social systems) and units of analysis (from genes to behavior). In this 
regard, highly anxious individuals could be thought as having alterations in negative-valence and cognitive sys-
tem processing. Negative valence systems are involved in the anticipation, maintenance and processing of aversive 
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situations (acute/potential threat, loss, etc.), and the cognitive systems are a set of interrelated cognitive processes 
such as attention, cognitive control, perception and language.
Thus, a classical threat conditioning paradigm targets only the acute threat construct of the negative system 
domain. Highly anxious individuals show an orchestrated response within various systems16, which alters the 
inner experience of the subject. This idea is also supported by the diversity of cognitive, emotional and behavio-
ral symptoms in anxiety disorders. Moreover, if one considers that anxiety functions to anticipate, prepare and 
respond to actual and potential threats3, it makes sense that it does not rely on only one processing system (neg-
ative valence system, i.e., physiological reactivity to cues) and that several cognitive processes might be involved. 
For example, highly anxious individuals show a faster detection of negative material (attentional bias towards 
threat), a stronger response to aversive cues (heightened reactivity to threat), recall more threat-related informa-
tion (memory bias) and overestimate the probability and severity of negative events (exaggerated threat-value cal-
culations)3,7, all of which are not generally targeted by current threat conditioning paradigms in normal/healthy 
subjects. Generally, learning and memory as primary brain processes are able to control, bias or affect several 
cognitive and emotional processes11,13. Previous studies on threat conditioning have focused on single dimensions 
such as attentional and evaluative components, showing that in the short term, fear acquisition can produce an 
attentional bias and an increment of the aversive appraisal to fear-related cues17,18. However, it is important to note 
that another fundamental, missing aspect is whether an acquired fear memory is able to maintain its effects on 
cognitive and valenced systems with the passage of time. Extensive evidence supports the idea that once acquired, 
a short-term memory passes through a stabilization phase, called memory consolidation, in order to persist19. 
This neurobiological process implies changes in the content, strength and “resolution” of the stored representation 
such as forgetting, generalization and gist memory20–24.
Here, inspired by the RDoc matrix and their conceptual systems, we aimed to study how a given experience 
(memory) could affect the complexity of different valenced and cognitive systems and to determine their persis-
tence (consolidation) in a normal population. To reach this goal, subjects first were assessed and then underwent 
threat conditioning or an equivalent control task (without an US). Five minutes (short-term evaluation groups) 
or 48 hs (long-term evaluation groups) later, subjects performed different tasks (Fig. 1A) systematically targeting 
negative-valence (state anxiety, stimuli representation and valuation), positive-valence (valuation) and cognitive 
systems (attentional bias and semantic fluency). In other words, in this study, we asked whether threat condi-
tioning is capable of producing and maintaining a change in valenced (positive/negative) and cognitive systems 
capturing the deficits associated with anxiety- and fear-related disorders.
Results
Subjective assessment and threat conditioning. Seventy participants completed the subjective assess-
ment and were randomly assigned to a threat-training (TR) or no-training (no-TR) group. Those in the TR group 
underwent threat conditioning, and subjects in the no-TR group performed the same task in the total absence of 
the US. In the Short-term evaluation (nTR group = 19, nno-TR group = 18), five minutes after conditioning, both 
the trained and not-trained groups were evaluated for negative-valence, positive-valence and cognitive systems 
using several different tasks (Fig. 1A, see below). In the Long-term evaluation (nTR group = 17, nno-TR group = 16), 
two other independent trained and not-trained groups were evaluated 48 hs after threat conditioning, using the 
same tasks. To obtain an assessment of subjects’ trait anxiety and the presence of physiological symptoms, the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S and STAI-T16) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI17) questionnaires 
were used. Participants in the Trained (TR) and not-Trained (noTR) groups did not differ in self-reported trait 
anxiety (STAI-T, TR group mean: 32.61 ± 1.07 and noTR mean: 32.22 ± 1.31; t64 = 0.223) or anxiety symptoma-
tology (BAI; TR group mean: 10.24 ± 1.21 and noTR mean: 9.27 ± 0.98; t62 = 0.492). Then, three different male-
face pictures (CS1, CS2, and CS3) serve as the conditioned stimulus (CS). Two of them (CS1 and CS2) expressed 
anger on their faces, and the other one (CS3) was neutral. In the trained groups, either CS1 or CS2 was associated 
with the unconditioned stimulus (US) in 75% of the trials in a counterbalanced manner. Hereinafter, we will call 
the aversive reinforced stimulus “CS+”, the unreinforced aversive stimulus “CSa” and the neutral stimulus “CSn”. 
The no-training group received the same instruction and performed the same task in the absence of the tone-US.
We analyzed threat conditioning (SCR) using a mixed repeated-measure ANOVA with Group as 
between-subjects factor and Stimulus (CS+, CSa and CSn) and Trial (1–8) as within-subjects factors. 
Successful threat acquisition was found in the TR group (Fig. 1B; mixed repeated-measures ANOVA, Group 
× Stimulus × Trial Interaction: F2.128 = 3.21, P = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.48). Moreover, there was a differential increase in 
skin conductance response (SCR) amplitudes for CS+ relative to CSa and CSn from the first to the last trials in 
the TR group but not in the no-TR group (Simple effects last trial P(CS+ vs all cs) < 0.005). At this point, both groups 
were then randomly assigned to a short-term (5 min) or long-term evaluation (48 hs later) of valenced (negative/
positive) and cognitive systems.
The overall effect of threat conditioning on the negative-valence, positive-valence and cognitive systems 
was analyzed by means of a 2 (Group: trained vs not-trained) × 2 (Time: short-term evaluation vs long-term 
evaluation) MANOVA followed by separate Two-way ANOVA’s for each dependent variable. The two-way 
MANOVA revealed a robust effect of training (Group: Wilks’ λ = 0.475, F9.00 = 7.00, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.535), Time 
(Wilks’ λ = 0.690, F9.00 = 2.93, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.329), as well an interaction (Group × Time: Wilks’ λ = 0.687, 
F9.00 = 2.890, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.313) on the negative-valence, positive-valence and cognitive systems. In order to 
disentangle these effects, separate 2 (Group: trained vs not-trained) × 2 (Time: Short-term vs Long-term evalua-
tion) ANOVA’s (Group × Time) were performed on each dependent variable.
Threat conditioning effects on the negative valence and positive valence systems. State Anxiety. 
Current anxiety or perceived distress levels were measured by the mean difference in STAI-S scores between 
post- minus pre-threat conditioning for each group (Fig. 1A). A main effect of training was found on state anxiety 
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(Two-way ANOVA, Group factor: F1.65 = 4.69, P < 0.005, ηp2 = 0.66) but not for evaluation Time (F1.65 = 0.808, 
P > 0.05) or interaction (F1.65 = 2.33, P > 0.05). In the short-term evaluation groups, participants in the TR group 
maintained a similar perceived distress level (STAI-S score difference) before and after training, relative to the 
no-TR group (Fig. 2A, follow up pairwise comparison P < 0.01). As expected, the long-term evaluation, found 
no differences between TR and no-TR groups (STAI-S; P > 0.05). This result is reasonable, considering the mild 
“threat” level during threat conditioning, the unspecific arousal measurement of STAI-S and the 48 hs between 
the first and second measurements.
Stimuli Representation (aversiveness). Before (pre) and after (post) threat conditioning (Fig. 1A), subjects 
were instructed to rank on a 0 to 8 scale how aversive or unpleasant were 10 pictures of male faces (5 angry 
and 5 neutral, including the CS+, CSa and CSn pictures) presented randomly on the monitor. With the mean 
scores, we calculated a stimuli representation discrimination index (CS+ vs CSa) and a generalization index (all 
aversive pictures vs all neutral pictures) for each group. In both the short-term and long-term evaluations, we 
found a significant effect of threat conditioning training on discrimination index (Two-way ANOVA, Group 
factor: F1.65 = 11.128, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.15). Evaluation Time (F1.65 = 0.140, P > 0.05) or interaction (F1.65 = 0.118, 
Figure 1. Experimental timeline and threat conditioning. (A) Experimental design. Left panel. After arriving, 
the subjects were first assessed (BAI, STAI-T), completed the first part of the aversiveness rating task (stimuli 
representation) and then underwent threat conditioning or a control task (no-US). Right Panel. Five minutes 
(Short-term evaluation) or 48 hs (Long-term evaluation) later, the participants completed several tasks targeting 
the negative-valence (state anxiety, stimuli representation, negative valuation), positive-valence (positive 
valuation) and cognitive systems (attentional bias and semantic fluency). (B) Threat conditioning. Subjects in 
the TR groups successfully acquired the aversive memory while those in the control task (no-TR group) did 
not. (C) Mean SCR (μS) for CS+, CSa and CSn for TR and no-TR groups in the Short-term evaluation and the 
Long-term evaluation. Mean SCR (μS) ± SEM, *P < 0.05.
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P > 0.05) were not significant. Subjects in the TR groups rated the CS+ as more aversive and unpleasant than the 
CSa (Discrimination Index – Fig. 2B upper panel: follow up pairwise comparison: Short-term evaluation P < 0.01 
and Long-term evaluation P < 0.05). Regarding the Generalization index, the two-way ANOVA revealed only a 
main effect of training (Group: F1.65 = 10.515, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.15; Time: F1.65 = 0.99, P > 0.05) and a significant 
Group × Time interaction (F1.65 = 9.287, P < 0.01, ηp2 = 0.12) revealing a generalization effect after consolidation 
(Long-term evaluation). Notably, the “acquired aversion” for the CS+ (TR groups) in the short-term evalua-
tion did not generalize to the other negative stimuli (Generalization Index – Fig. 2B Lower panel: simple effects: 
P > 0.05). However, 48 hs after threat conditioning (once consolidation ended), participants in the TR group 
showed a generalization effect and rated all the negative stimuli presented as more aversive relative to the neutral 
stimuli (Long-term evaluation, Generalization Index – Fig. 2B: simple effects: P < 0.005).
Valuation. We designed a task in order to assess the subjective expected value assigned to the aversive CSs (CS+ 
and CSa) in imagined positive or negative scenarios. Following threat conditioning, the subjects were presented 
randomly on the computer with 24 positive and 24 negative situations involving either CS and its pictures as 
a “fictional character” (12 valenced situations for CS+ and CSa). For each positive and negative scenario, the 
subjects first responded on a 0 to 8 scale how likely was the hypothetical event and then how good/bad it would 
be for them, using the same scale. We then calculated the expected value (subject-assigned mean probability 
multiplied by its mean negative/positive magnitude) for CS+ and CSa in positive and negative situations for 
each group (trained and not-trained). Figure 2C displays the mean score difference for the estimated positive/
negative expected values for the Short-term and the Long-term evaluation. A main effect of training and evalu-
ation time was found for the negative scenarios (Two-way ANOVA, Group: F1.65 = 19.230, P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.30; 
Time: F1.65 = 7.257, P < 0.01 ηp2 = 0.10) and their interaction (F1.65 = 5.696, P < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.10). In the Short-term 
evaluation, the TR group compared to the no-TR group rated as more likely and adverse the negative scenarios 
involving the CS+ relative to the CSa (simple effects P < 0.001). We found no evidence of this effect for the pos-
itive scenarios (F1.65 = 0.016, P > 0.05). Regarding the long-term evaluation, we found no difference between TR 
and no-TR groups in either negative or positive scenarios (simple effects negative: P > 0.05; positive: P > 0.05), 
Figure 2. Threat conditioning affects negative-valence and cognitive systems after memory acquisition (Short-
term evaluation) and memory consolidation (Long-term evaluation). (A) State anxiety: mean difference in STAI 
scores before and after training. (B) Stimuli representation (aversiveness): Upper panel: Discrimination index 
mean difference for CS+ and CSa ratings; Lower panel: Generalization index: relation between mean ratings for 
aversive pictures and neutral pictures (not seen during training). (C) Valuation: Subjects assigned negative and 
positive expected values (probability x cost in a 0–8 scale) for hypothetical events regarding CS+ and CSa. (D) 
Semantic fluency: Relation between the number of words generated for the neutral and negative category. Blue 
bars represent no-TR groups, and red bars represent TR groups (E) Attentional bias (dot probe): Difference in 
ms between incongruent and congruent trials for 3 types of stimuli compounds (CS+ vs CSa, CS+ vs CSn and 
CSa vs CSn). *P < 0.05.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
5SCIENTIFIC RepoRts |  (2018) 8:11221  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-018-29603-3
revealing that the higher negative expected value did not persist over time or its generalized in negative scenarios 
between the aversive CS’s.
In summary, these results show that threat conditioning (TR group) specifically affects the negative valence 
systems and not the positive valence systems (Positive expected value). Moreover, threat training has more impact 
at short-term evaluation than at long-term evaluation, suggesting that some effects on the negative valence sys-
tems underwent a generalization process or did not survive the memory consolidation process.
Threat conditioning effects on the cognitive systems. Semantic fluency. Subjects were asked to gen-
erate as many as possible words aloud in 60 sec belonging to a neutral category (words related to a supermarket) 
and an aversive category (words related to fear and negative emotions)25. The mean number of words generated 
by subjects in each category was used to estimate a fluency index (Aversivecategory/Neutralcategory) for each group. 
For the short-term and long-term evaluations, both the TR and no-TR groups generated roughly the same num-
ber of words (during 1 min) in the neutral or negative category (Fig. 2D; Two-way ANOVA Group: F1.65 = 1.125, 
P > 0.05; Time: F1.65 = 1.140, P > 0.05; Interaction: F1.65 = 0.685, P > 0.05).
Attentional bias. Subjects performed a pictorial dot probe task26 to evaluate the existence of an acquired atten-
tional bias toward threat. Each trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the screen for 500 ms, followed by 
the simultaneous display of two CSs (left/right) for 500 ms. After the brief stimulus presentation, the CS picture 
disappeared, and a small white probe appeared in the previous location (left/right) occupied by one of the CSs 
for 1000 ms (Fig. 1A). Using an external keypad with two buttons, participants were asked to press a button as 
fast as they could, according to where they detected the white probe (left/right). Participants had 2000 ms to 
respond in each trial. Here, we used 4 types of stimulus compounds: (1) CS+ vs CSa; (2) CS+ vs CSn; (3) CSa vs 
CSn and (4) two neutral faces that had not appeared before in the experiment (filler trials). An attentional bias 
is inferred from faster reaction times (RTs) on trials where the probe is presented at the previous location of the 
threatening cue (congruent trials) compared to those where the target is located at the previous location of the 
non-threatening cue (incongruent trials). In our protocol, we considered congruent trials to be when the probe 
appeared at the CS+ location (stimulus compounds 1 and 2) or CSa (stimulus compound 3) and incongruent tri-
als to be the remaining possibilities (probe CSa or CSn on stimulus compounds 1 and 2 and CSn on compound 3). 
The mean RT from the dot probe task was estimated for each group per condition taking the difference between 
incongruent and congruent trials. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of threat conditioning on 
reaction times for CS+ vs CSa (Group: F1.65 = 4.700, P < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.10) and CS+ vs CSn (Group: F1.65 = 14.258, 
P < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.18) but not for evaluation time (F1.65 = 2.247, P > 0.05 and F1.65 = 1.091, P > 0.05, respectively) 
or their interaction (F1.65 = 0.718, P > 0.05 and F1.65 = 0.700, P > 0.05, respectively). In the Short-term evaluation, 
we found a significant acquired attentional bias toward threat (dot-probe task) in the TR group compared to the 
no-TR group (Fig. 2E left). In the TR group, RT and probe detection were faster for the CS+ relative to the CSa 
(CS+ vs CSa: pairwise comparisons P < 0.05) or CS-n (CS+ vs CSn: pairwise comparisons P < 0.01). Figure 2E 
shows the results of the dot-probe task in the Long-term evaluation. Here, we found a persistent attentional bias 
toward threat, specifically in the TR group, only when the CS+ was confronted with the CS-n (Fig. 2E right, 
CS+ vs CSn: P < 0.01) but not with Csa (CS+ vs CSa, P > 0.05). Finally, the RTs for not-trained aversive CS 
(CSa) against the neutral CS (CSn) were similar in the TR and no-TR groups in both the Short-term evaluation 
and the Long-term evaluation (Two-way ANOVA, Group: F1.65 = 0.005, P > 0.05; Time: F1.65 = 1.615, P > 0.05; 
Interaction: F1.65 = 0.589, P > 0.05).
These results suggest that not all cognitive systems are affected by threat conditioning. We showed that an 
attentional bias towards threat could be acquired and maintained after memory consolidation (Long-term evalu-
ation). However, the semantic component remained unaffected.
Group and system clustering. To verify if the negative-valence, positive-valence and cognitive systems 
are able to discriminate groups, we performed a discriminant analysis using the entire but without considering 
threat conditioning values. The discriminant analysis revealed three functions, two of which were significant 
(P < 0.001, Fig. 3): the first explained 60% of the variance, canonical R2 = 0.60, and the second clarified 33% of 
the variance, canonical R2 = 0.42. In combination, the discriminant functions significantly differentiated between 
TR and no-TR groups (First function: Wilks’ λ = 0.23, χ227 = 92.33, P < 0.001; Second function: Wilks’ λ = 0.51, 
χ216 = 41,73, P < 0.001). Moreover, we found a difference in the contribution of each measure to group separation. 
In the first function, correlations between outcomes and the discriminant function (structure matrix) revealed a 
fair correlation with negative expected value (r = 0.77) and attentional bias (r = 0.50) and a poor correlation with 
positive expected value (r = 0.03) and stimuli aversiveness (generalization index r = 0.06). In the second function, 
the best correlation was found for the stimuli aversiveness (generalization index r = 0.87 and discrimination 
index r = 0.60) and here, semantic fluency had the worst association (r = 0.04). The classification results of this 
model accurately predicted group membership for 75.5% of the cases. This analysis indicates that, leaving threat 
conditioning aside, subjects could be correctly classified according to their performance in the negative-valence, 
positive-valence and cognitive systems.
We next further investigated the cognitive and valenced systems by means of a principal component analysis 
(PCA) to assess its viability as constructs in our experimental design. A PCA was conducted on the 4 groups, 
using the significant measures from the Two-way MANOVA with varimax rotation. Sample adequacy and appro-
priate correlation between items were verified by the KMO test = 0.55 (all individual values were above >0.5) 
and Bartlett test of sphericity χ215 = 26.50, P = 0.03 respectively. Using eigenvalues >1, we found two factors that 
explain 59.3% of the variance. Table S2 (Supplemental Material) shows the factor loading after rotation and the 
components in each factor. These results suggest, as expected, that the cognitive systems (attentional bias) and 
the negative valence system (discrimination index, STAI-S and negative expected value) are differently affected.
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Discussion
The current findings provide evidence that an experience can change negative valenced systems and create a 
specific cognitive bias in a manner congruent with the valence of the acquired memory. Hence, these changes in 
cognitive and negative-valence systems are not transient or a byproduct of short-term memory facilitation. The 
acquired behavioral profile is maintained or transformed with the passage of time. Here, we showed that standard 
threat conditioning alters the negative valence systems and creates a cognitive bias. In the Short-term evalua-
tion we revealed that, 5 min after successful conditioning (TR group), (1) subject’s state-anxiety and aversiveness 
representation of the CS+ (discrimination index) increased, along the estimated probability and cost for hypo-
thetical negative events (valuation) and (2) RTs for the CS+ when confronted with the CSa or CSn were faster, 
reflecting an attentional bias toward threat. In contrast, in the Long-term evaluation, which was conducted after 
memory consolidation (48 hs after threat conditioning), we found a different system profile, which revealed the 
following: (1) Participants represented the CS+ as more aversive than the unreinforced CSa, although here, all the 
aversive pictures were also perceived as being more negative (discrimination and generalization index); (2) RTs 
were only faster for the CS+ relative to the CSn, suggesting a more restricted attentional bias compared to groups 
evaluated 5 min after conditioning; (3) State-anxiety and negative expected values in the TR group did not differ 
from those in the no-TR group. These results suggest that after memory consolidation, a generalization process 
between the trained cue (CS+) and the others occurred. In the Short-term evaluation and the Long-term evalu-
ation, semantic fluency and positive valuation were unaffected, indicating that threat conditioning as an aversive 
memory did not affect all the cognitive or valence systems. Additionally, the discriminant analysis revealed that 
the experimental tasks are reliable predictors of group membership, and the PCA confirmed the existence of only 
two factors in our data (cognitive systems and negative valence system).
At this point, our proposal is to analyze present results in the framework of the consolidation process. This 
process and the later transformations of the memory traces imply that memories are dynamic rather than static, 
and they do not represent an instant photograph of a specific event. Here, a consolidated fear memory maintains 
a specific bias in cognitive and valence systems. As was postulated, memories not only are integrated into the 
existing network but also suffer a time-dependent transformation. As a consequence, the strength and specific 
features (content) of the trace vary with the passage of time. In this sense, the recently acquired threat condition-
ing constitutes a trace with moderate strength, high level of precision (details) and low level of integration with 
previous networks. However, with the passage of time and memory consolidation, the stored representation of 
threat memory is changed. Thus, forgetting of some aspects, as an adaptative process, is involved in preventing 
memory overfitting and allowing memory generalization22. As a consequence, the consolidated threat-memory 
is now a trace with moderate-to-low strength, moderate level of precision (details) and more interconnected with 
previous networks. We can use the same line of thinking for the construction of the memories associated with 
anxiety disorders to understand their effects on cognitive systems and the specific bias to a more generalized type 
of stimuli. These memories change the relevance of each feature and the way of processing actual information 
Figure 3. Negative-valence and cognitive systems accurately predict individuals’ acquired threat value of cues 
through threat conditioning. Functions at group centroids: Function 1 maximally separates trained (light and 
dark red) from not-trained (light and dark blue) groups and Function 2 differentiates groups at short- (dark red) 
or long-term (light red) evaluation. Black squares stand for group centroids.
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every moment. Our results are in line with this concept, as the results observed 48 hours after training are the 
outcome of such transformation.
Over the past decades, the study of threat or “fear” conditioning as a model of anxiety disorders has focused 
on peripheral sympathetic responses to trained cues (implicit memory). However, it become clear that anxiety 
disorders are far more than an associative response27,28. Several models have assigned a central role to anticipatory 
responses to threat uncertainty as a transdiagnostic feature across anxiety disorders3,29. These responses involve 
a differential processing of cognitive and negative-valence systems at physiological, behavioral and cognitive 
levels. For example, highly anxious individuals show an exaggerated threat appraisal of the probability and cost 
of potential or rare negative events (disrupted valuation). Moreover, the intensity of the response to predictable 
or unpredictable cues is increased (heightened reactivity to threat uncertainty). Finally, individuals with anxiety 
disorders exhibit a marked attentional bias toward threat and negative events (increased threat attention and 
hypervigilance)26,30. Our results are in line with these ideas, showing that threat training in a healthy population 
is able to generate similar anticipatory responses to threats such as those encountered in anxiety disorders. One 
possible limitation of our experimental design was that the positive valence domain was only represented by a 
subset of items in a single task. Another limitation comes from the training strength of the threat condition-
ing. Our protocol generated a memory of “moderate” strength which differs in intensity from the exaggerated 
fear commonly observed in anxiety disorders. It could be speculated that, differences in training strength could 
produce different profiles on the negative valence and cognitive systems such as a more detailed memory at the 
expense of generalization after stronger trainings (i.e. negative valuation or attentional bias may survive memory 
consolidation). However, despite such limitations, this study contributes a novel approach in the context of the 
RDoC domains. Future studies, including tasks associated with the positive valence system in healthy subjects 
and a comparison with subclinical profiles of anxiety, will open new avenues to deeply understand the origin and 
maintenance of these pathologies.
The RDoc proposed a matrix composed of several systems with the objective of generating a new framework 
to study and treat mental disorders. In this regard, we believe that acute threat conditioning followed by tasks 
targeting cognitive and valenced systems of the RDoc matrix could be a useful resource in normal populations to 
better understand the complexity of mental illness.
Methods
Participants. A total of 70 undergraduate and graduate youths (40 females and 30 males) from Buenos Aires 
University (Argentina) with a mean age of 23.7 ± 0.5 years participated in the current study. Five other subjects 
were excluded from the analysis based on the inclusion criterion (see the subjective assessment and threat condi-
tioning subsections). Before the experiments, participants signed a written informed consent form approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the Review Board of the Sociedad Argentina de Investigación Clínica in accordance with 
the Declaration of Helsinki.
Subjective assessment. Only subjects with low to moderate anxiety (STAI-T <45 and BAI < 29) were 
included in the analysis because highly anxious individuals show increased physiological reactivity (i.e., electro-
dermal activity, startle reflex) during threat conditioning and an altered learning rate31.
Threat conditioning. Three fear-relevant stimuli served as the conditioned stimulus (CS)32. The pictures 
were taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database33. Three different male-face pictures 
(CS1, CS2, and CS3) were presented in the center of a black screen (slides of 9,5 cm × 7 cm. Two of them (CS1 and 
CS2) expressed anger on their faces, and the other one (CS3) was neutral (no emotion). Each stimulus appeared 
8 times (24 trials total) representing a moderate training intensity. In the trained groups, either CS1 or CS2 was 
associated with the unconditioned stimulus (US) in 75% of the trials in a counterbalanced manner. Hereinafter, 
we will call the aversive reinforced stimulus “CS+,” the unreinforced aversive stimulus “CSa” and the neutral 
stimulus “CSn”. An auditory stimulus (tone) with duration of 1, 5 s delivered through stereo headphones served 
as the US. All the CSs were presented for 6 s, and the US appeared 1, 5 s before CS offset. The interval between 
stimuli varied among 8 s, 10 s, and 12 s. The tone was generated by a TG/WN Tone-Noise Generator (Psychlab), 
digitally controlled with a mean of 98 db ± 4 db. The US was adjusted for each subject to be “unpleasant but not 
painful” (100 db was the maximum allowed for any subject). The no-training group received the same instruc-
tion and performed the same task in the absence of the tone-US. Threat conditioning was measured by the skin 
conductance response (SCR). The input device (Psychlab Precision Contact Instruments) has a sine excitation 
voltage (±0.5 V) of 50 Hz derived from the main frequency. The device was connected to two Ag/AgCl electrodes 
of 20 mm × 16 mm located in the intermediate phalanges of the non-dominant hand. The SCR produced by each 
CS was measured by taking the average baseline to the first peak within the 0,5–4,5 s window following the stim-
ulus onset. A minimum response criterion of 0,002 microSiemens (µS) was used, and all the other responses were 
scored as zero34,35. Data were analyzed with MATLAB and Ledalab36. Only subjects who showed differential fear 
responses (CS+ SCR amplitude > CSa and CSn) were considered for analysis.
Stimuli Representation (aversiveness). The discrimination index was determined using the mean differ-
ence in time (post- or pre-threat conditioning) between the aversive CS presented during threat condition-
ing [(postCS+score − preCS+score)/(postCSascore − preCSa score)]. The generalization index was estimated using the 
mean difference between all the aversive and neutral faces after threat conditioning divided by this difference 
before treatment [(postAversiveented during threat conditioningpostNeutral)/(preAversiveented during threat 
conditioningpreNeutral)].
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
8SCIENTIFIC RepoRts |  (2018) 8:11221  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-018-29603-3
Valuation (expected value). To reduce complexity for statistical purposes, we calculated the difference 
between the negative and positive expected values between CS+ and CSa and retained only 2 expected val-
ues in total for each group [(Expected Value CS+positive) − (Expected Value CSapositive)] and [(Expected Value 
CS+negative) − (Expected Value CSanegative)]. An example of a negative event could be: “How likely would it be for 
you to have problems at work with HIM?” and then: “How bad would it be for you to have problems at work with 
HIM?” (always accompanied by the CS+ or CSa picture). In contrast, a positive situation could be: “How likely 
would it be for HIM to take you to the airport?” and then: “How good would it be for HIM to take you to the 
airport?”.
Semantic fluency. Repeated words as well as those related to other categories were excluded from analysis.
Attentional bias. The probe position (left/right) and face location were counterbalanced. Subjects performed a 
total of 160 trials in two blocks of 80 (40 trials per condition). The mean RT from the dot probe task was estimated 
for each group per condition taking the difference between incongruent and congruent trials. Errors of commis-
sion (failure to detect the correct probe location) or omission (not responding) and responses less than 150 ms or 
greater than 2000 ms were not included in the analysis. Trials in which the RT was ±2 SD of the subjects’ mean 
for a specific condition were also excluded from analysis. The percentage of excluded responses was 1.9% for the 
Short-term evaluation groups and 2.2% for the Long-term evaluation Groups.
Data analysis. The initial subjective assessments (STAI-T and BAI) was analyzed using an independent t-test 
between groups. Skin conductance response amplitudes in the threat conditioning were analyzed by means of a 
mixed ANOVA for repeated-measures with “group” as the between-subjects factor and “stimulus” (CS+, CSa 
and CSn) and “trial” (trials 1–8) as within-subjects factors. When the interaction was significant, simple effects 
were performed. When sphericity was not accomplished, Greenhouse−Geisser correction was applied. The main 
effect of threat conditioning on the target variables was analyzed using a two-way MANOVA with Group (trained 
vs not trained) and Time (short term vs long term evaluation) as independent factors and the negative valence, 
positive valence and cognitive systems as dependent variables, followed by separate Two-way ANOVA’s for each 
dependent variable and a discriminant function analysis. Then each Two-way ANOVA was followed by post hoc 
pairwise comparison using the Bonferroni correction for the main effects. Significant interactions were analyzed 
with simple effects and post hoc Tukey comparisons.
All raw data are presented in Table S1 (Supplemental Material).
Code availability. All tasks were coded with MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc., Sherborn, MA, USA) and the 
Psychtoolbox module. The statistical analysis was calculated using IBM SPSS Statistics 22 and no custom code was 
generated for these experiments.
Data availability. The datasets obtained in the current study are available from the corresponding author 
upon request.
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